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Books About Being Vegan Appeal No. B150017 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE JEROLD DANIEL FRIEDMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PERMANENTE Defendants and Respondents. From The Superior Court for Los
Angeles County APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF MYER LAW FIRM SCOTT D. MYER, ESQ. (State Bar No.126048) 11040 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 320 Los Angeles, CA 90025-7515 Phone 310.277.3000 Fax 310.444.3214 Email myerlaw@bestlawyer.com Web www.bestlawyer.com Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, JEROLD DANIEL FRIEDMAN, also known as JERRY FRIEDMAN TABLE OF CONTENTS
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From Online Version] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
[Table of Authorities Deleted From Online Version]
Appeal No. B150017 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE JEROLD DANIEL FRIEDMAN, also known as JERRY FRIEDMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, a California partnership; KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS, a California corporation; KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC., a California corporation, Defendants and Respondents. APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF INTRODUCTION This appeal is from a Judgment [See Appellant's Appendix in Lieu of Clerk's Transcript (hereinafter, referred to as "AA"), p. 000557, et seq.], incorporating the sustaining of two Demurrers [See AA p. 000163, et seq., and AA p. 000342, et seq.], and the denials of a Motion and Requests for Leave to Amend [See AA p. 000556, as well as AA p. 000163, et seq., and AA p. 000342, et seq.]. This case is primarily about allegations regarding Defendants/Respondents' failure to accommodate the Plaintiff/Appellant's religious ethical belief of not harming animals that is the Plaintiff/Appellant's ethical and moral equivalent of his religion. The Plaintiff/Appellant alleges he is an Ethical Vegan and was a Computer Technician working in a non-public, non-health care facility, warehouse for Kaiser(1) in Downey, as a contract worker, having absolutely no contact with patients. Plaintiff/Appellant alleges that his actual employment was with MacTemps, which entity contracted out his services to Kaiser, and after working for nearly one-year for Kaiser as a contract worker through MacTemps, Kaiser liked the Plaintiff/Appellant's work so well that Kaiser offered the Plaintiff/Appellant an in-house position doing the same work, at the same location, continuing to also have absolutely no contact with patients. However, it is alleged that Kaiser required the Plaintiff/Appellant to undergo a health/vaccination screening. [The Complaint is at AA, p. 000001, et seq., and these allegations are discussed further in the Statement of the Case section below]. The Plaintiff/Appellant has alleged he is has an Ethical Vegan belief of not harming animals. Plaintiff/Appellant alleges that when he, a contract worker at Kaiser in April of 1998 refused - for moral, ethical and religious reasons - to take a mumps vaccination that included material from chicken embryos, his employment contract/work offer with Kaiser was canceled and a full-time work offer was rescinded and he was removed from Kaiser under his contract. Plaintiff/Appellant alleges that his job was rescinded solely because he refused to take a mumps vaccination which violated his strongly held religious ethical principles and beliefs, and he suffered severe damages as a result. Plaintiff/Appellant alleges that the reason that the Plaintiff/Appellant refused the test because it is grown in chicken embryos, violating his Ethical Vegan beliefs, which prohibit the eating, wearing or using of any animal products. According to the Plaintiff/Appellant's Ethical Vegan belief system, egg-laying hens suffer greatly in chicken factory farms, and the use of unborn chickens to culture the mumps vaccine causes further unnecessary deaths of chickens. Although, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a Determination in a case that Veganism is the equivalent of a religious belief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, there is no known case dealing directly with Veganism or Ethical Veganism as a religious belief. However, in this case, the Court below sustained demurrers as to the causes of action dealing with the religious discrimination in employment, leaving only a breach of the implied in fact contract cause of action. That remaining cause of action has since been dismissed. Additionally, subsequent to his termination, the Plaintiff/Appellant also discovered that a tuberculosis ("TB") test administered to him by Kaiser - which, he had been assured by Kaiser, contained no animal products - did, in fact, include a bovine (cow) serum, negating his consent and leading to a battery. Further, Kaiser's use of the TB test in this matter, violated a state law to protect people from being unwitting experimental subjects. This portion of the lawsuit alleges that the Plaintiff/Appellant was not fully informed about the medical procedure, as required by law, and alleges that he was made a "medical experiment" under the law. As a result of the Defendant/Respondents' actions, the Plaintiff/Appellant has suffered loss of income, pain and suffering, post-traumatic stress disorder, embarrassment, anxiety, humiliation and extreme and severe mental anguish and emotional distress because of his employment termination, and the injection of cow serum, which goes against his ethical Vegan beliefs.QUESTIONS PRESENTED The main questions and issues presented in this appeal are the following: 1. Ethical Veganism is a Religious Belief or the Equivalent of a Religious Belief for the Purposes of Employment Law Protections In California. The issue presented in this appeal is whether Ethical Veganism is a religious belief or the equivalent of a religious belief, subject to the protections of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code §12900, et seq., (sometime herein referred to as FEHA), and the administrative regulations promulgated thereunder. The Court below wrongly concluded that Ethical Veganism is not a religious belief nor the equivalent of a religious belief, and was not subject to the protections of the FEHA. Also presented is the issue of whether, should the Plaintiff/Appellant have originally failed to plead his belief in Ethical Veganism sufficiently, whether leave to amend should have been granted when the Complaint had not only never been before the court before, but the Complaint had never been previously been amended. The court's ruling was error in failing to hold that Ethical Veganism was a religious belief or the equivalent of a religious belief under the FEHA. 2. The Plaintiff/Appellant's Tort Claims are Not Within the Worker's Compensation Exclusivity Provisions as the Actions of the Defendant/Respondent's Falls Outside the Compensation Bargain. It is clear that the Plaintiff's employment discrimination claims fall outside of worker's compensation exclusivity. This is so clear that the underlying sustaining of the demurrers as to the employment discrimination causes of action was not made on this basis. However, this same analysis should likewise hold that the other causes of action, fall outside the compensation bargain and are therefore also not within the worker's compensation exclusivity. 3. Even if the Demurrers Had Merit, Then Leave to Amend Should Have Been Granted. While the Plaintiff/Appellant contends that the Demurrers were improperly sustained, even if they were proper, leave to amend should have been granted at the early stage of litigation that the Demurrers were sustained at. Additional issues are presented herein. STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Plaintiff JEROLD FRIEDMAN sued various KAISER entities for violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Government Code §12900, et seq., herein referred to as the "FEHA"). [Appellants' Appendix In Lieu of Clerk's Transcript (hereinafter referred to as "AA," p. 000001, et seq.]. According to the Plaintiff/Appellant's pleadings, [See the Complaint herein, AA p. 000001, et seq.], and confirmed by the court in its order, at AA p. 000163, and AA pp. 000164-000165, in particular: For the past nine years, the Plaintiff/Appellant has been a strict Ethical Vegan, meaning that he believes that all living beings must be valued equally and that it is immoral and unethical for humans to kill and exploit animals, even for food, clothing and the testing of product safety for humans. Among the consequences of this belief are that the Plaintiff/Appellant cannot eat any animal based substances, such as meat, milk products, eggs, honey, or any other food which contains ingredients derived from or tested on animals, that the Plaintiff/Appellant cannot use products which have been tested for human safety on animals or which derive any of their ingredients from animals such as cleaners, soap or toothpaste. Plaintiff/Appellant asserts these views as spiritual in nature, that he holds them with the strength of traditional religious views, that Plaintiff/Appellant's views are so strong that he has even been arrested for civil disobedience actions at animal rights demonstrations, that these beliefs occupy a position in the Plaintiff/Appellant's life parallel to that filled by God in traditionally religious individuals adhering to the Christian, Jewish or Muslim Faiths. [See AA p. 000002]. Further, according to the Plaintiff/Appellant's pleadings, [See the Complaint herein, AA p. 000001, et seq.], and confirmed by the court in its order, at AA p. 000163, and AA pp. 000165-000166, in particular: From June 10, 1997, the Plaintiff/Appellant worked as a computer contractor through a temporary help agency, MacTemps, at a Kaiser pharmaceutical warehouse-not at a medical office, clinic nor hospital. In March 1998, Kaiser decided to hire the Plaintiff/Appellant at a salary of approximately $48,800.00 per year. On March 26, 1998, Kaiser informed the Plaintiff/Appellant that Kaiser required that the Plaintiff/Appellant undergo an immunization for mumps; Plaintiff/Appellant checked with the Center for Disease Control and learned that the mumps vaccine is grown in chicken embryos, and according to the Plaintiff/Appellant, being inoculated with the mumps vaccine therefore was in violation of his Ethical Vegan beliefs, that in March 1998, the Plaintiff/Appellant advised Kaiser that he was however, willing to comply with the spirit of the immunization requirement by some means other than subjecting himself to inoculation with the vaccine for mumps, including being check periodically for mumps symptoms, following any other regimen not involving the suffering or death of an animal, and even agreeing to work off-site. Plaintiff/Appellant's direct supervisor at Kaiser was willing to accommodate the Plaintiff/Appellant, however, the upper management/human resources department was not, and on or about April 10, 1998, the Plaintiff/Appellant was told that was his last day. Plaintiff/Appellant alleges that the Kaiser Defendants/Respondents failed to reasonably accommodate his Ethical Vegan beliefs when he refused the mumps vaccination, and when they thereupon terminated his employment agreement. Further, according to the Plaintiff/Appellant's pleadings, [See the Complaint herein, AA p. 000001, et seq.], and confirmed by the court in its order, at AA p. 000163, and AA p. 000166, in particular, lines 11 to 15, inclusive: The Plaintiff/Appellant alleges that the mumps immunization requirement is inconsistently applied, that some visiting physicians who actually do work with patients have not been tested for the mumps antibodies and that some other workers have not been screened for mumps either. The Plaintiff/Appellant filed his COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES on February 3, 2000. [AA p. 000001, et seq.]. The Complaint alleged eleven (11) causes of action, including the first three (3) for employment discrimination, the first cause of action for employment discrimination against both the Kaiser and MacTemps(2) Defendants/Respondents based on religion under California Government Code §12940, the second cause of action for failure to maintain a work environment free from discrimination under California Government Code §12940(i) against both the Kaiser and MacTemps Defendants/Respondents, and the third cause of action for retaliation against the Kaiser Defendants/Respondents only based on the allegation that the Kaiser Defendants/Respondents' conduct was retaliatory under Government Code §12940(f). The Kaiser Defendants/Respondents filed their original Demurrer to the Complaint on March 24, 2000. [AA p. 000026, et seq.; See also their Memorandum of Points and Authorities, at AA p. 000032, et seq., and their Motion to Strike, at AA p. 000043, et seq.] The Plaintiff/Appellant filed his OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT, on April 14, 2000. [AA p. 000049, et seq.; See also Plaintiff/Appellant's OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, at AA p. 000065, et seq.]. An organization known as "In Defense of Animals" attempted to file an AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF on April 14, 2000, in support of the Plaintiff/Appellant's position. [See AA p. 000072, et seq.]. However, it appears to have been only lodged, not filed. However, prior to the matter having been heard the case was reassigned, on Mar. 24, 2000, to the Hon. Mel Red Recana from Hon. Carol Boas Goodson, for the Court's administrative reasons. [AA p. 000048]. And, in the interim, both the KAISER Defendants and the Plaintiff filed 170.6 Code of Civil Procedure affidavits. Therefore, both the Hon. Recana and then the Hon. Barbara Meiers were removed from the case. The case was then reassigned to the Hon. Judge Sohigian, on May 25, 2000. [AA p. 000080]. [See also Order of July 7, 2000 discussing said transfers at ¶2 and¶3, AA p. 000163, and AA p. 000164, in particular, lines 8 to 22, inclusive. Two ex parte hearings were heard on the Amicus Curiae Brief of "In Defense of Animals" on June 8, 2000. At that time, the proposed Amicus filed an Application to file the brief. [AA p. 000081, et seq., and AA p. 000083, et seq.] At that same time, the Kaiser Defendants/Respondents filed an ex Parte Application Striking Amicus Curiae Brief. [AA p. 000086, et seq.]. The Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Position Statement in support of the filing of said Amicus brief. [AA p. 000109, et seq.]. However, the Court denied the application to file the Amicus brief. [See the Minute Order reflecting same, at AA p. 000114, et seq.]. A copy of a notice of ruling that the Plaintiff/Appellant provided with regard to the attempt by the Amicus to file their brief is included at AA p. 000115, et seq. Plaintiff/Appellant filed an [AMENDED] OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT, on June 28, 2000, which is included as AA p. 000119, et seq. Also filed that date was an amended OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, which is included as AA p. 000136, et seq. On the same date as the hearing of the Demurrer and Motion to Strike, July 7, 2000, the Plaintiff filed an AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT SEC.474 C.C.P., in order to amend defendant DOE 1 to state instead the corporation MERCK & CO., INC., as a Defendant. [AA p. 000159]. At the hearing of the original demurrer, on July 7, 2000, the Court took the matter under submission, and thereafter, sustained all of the demurrers to the Fair Employment and Housing Act religious discrimination causes of action, i.e., causes of action one, two and three, without leave to amend. The remainder of the demurrers, i.e., the non-religious discrimination causes of action, were sustained with leave to amend. Causes of action ten and eleven were not a part of the demurrers that date. A copy of he MINUTE ORDER regarding this demurrer and motion to strike is included as AA p. 000161, et seq. Also, the Order Sustaining the Demurrer is included as AA p. 000163, et seq. The Court sets forth the issue herein at AA p. 000164, et seq. Essentially, the Demurrer to the first three causes of action was sustained because the Court believed that Veganism cannot be a religion or the equivalent of a religion under the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") statute, and refused the Plaintiff requested leave to amend on these causes of action related to religious discrimination and/or retaliation. An initial status conference was held on July 11, 2000. See AA p. 000171, consisting of the Minute Order of same. At that time the Court signed an Order Setting Further Status Conference and an Order re Trial Setting and Trial Preparation [see AA p. 000276, et seq.]. The Plaintiff/Appellant amended his complaint and filed a FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, on July 17, 2000. [AA p. 000001, et seq.] However, the portion of the Complaint dealing with employment discrimination against the Kaiser Defendant/Respondents was not allowed to be replead against the Kaiser Defendants/Respondents based upon the prior Order denying leave to amend. Therefore, and for that reason alone, the amended complaint was not plead against the Kaiser Defendants/Respondents for religious discrimination in the amended complaint. It was, however, plead against the MacTemps Defendants/Respondents as such. [See AA p. 000172, et seq.] The First Amended Complaint herein was filed by Plaintiff on July 17, 2000, which complaint listed, among other defendants, defendant MERCK & CO., INC. in the caption of the Complaint. On July 26, 2000, the KAISER defendants served a Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint on the Plaintiff. The Kaiser Defendants/Respondents set a new demurrer to the first amended complaint. [See AA p. 000200, et seq., and AA p. 000207, et seq.] Also at the same time, the MacTemps Defendants/Respondents set a Demurrer to the first amended complaint, which was filed on July 26, 2000. See AA p. 000254, et seq. Their Motion to strike was set for the same time. See AA p. 000270. The caption of the Demurrer listed the defendant MERCK among the listed defendants. Additionally, the KAISER defendants' Reply Brief's caption listed the defendant MERCK among the listed defendants. The Plaintiff/Appellant opposed both of those demurrers and the motion to strike by filing Oppositions, on August 4, 2000. See AA p. 000287, et seq., AA p. 000297, et seq., and AA p. 000316, et seq., respectively. The hearing on these demurrers/motions were held on August 16, 2000, at which time the Court sustained all of the demurrers, with the exception of the tenth cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith, which remained active. A copy of the MINUTE ORDER from hearing of demurrer/motion to strike on first amended complaint, is included as AA p. 000342. This is the second main order that this Petition for a Writ is seeking to vacate and set aside, the other being the July 7, 2000 Order. The Defendants/Respondents served their notices of ruling, which are included as AA p. 000343, et seq., and AA p. 000347, et seq., respectively. The Kaiser Defendants/Respondents filed their answer to the remaining tenth cause of action for breach of implied contract in the first amended complaint, on August 25, 2000. [AA p. 000351, et seq.] On September 5, 2000, the Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate and/or Prohibition or Other Appropriate Relief and Request for Stay of Action Pending Determination of Writ, with the Court of Appeals. On or about September 13, 2000, the Court of Appeals summarily denied the Petition for Writ, presumably because the Plaintiff has the right to file an appeal upon a Judgment being entered at the conclusion of this case. [See Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division Five, Docket No. B143989]. The parties appearing at that time, filed a JOINT STATUS AND CASE MANAGEMENT REPORT, on Sept. 19, 2000. [AA p. 000355]. At the further status conference, the court issued a written minute order, filed on Sept. 26, 2000, reflecting what had happened. [AA p. 000362]. On November 3, 2000, the MERCK Defendants, including MERCK & CO., INC., the company that Plaintiff would later thereafter find out that the Hon. Sohigian, Judge, owned an interest in, filed their ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT. [AA p. 000363]. On December 29, 2000, the Plaintiff dismissed the Aquent/MacTemps Defendants, after settling his claims against them, and they are not a part of this appeal. [AA p. 000369]. On January 18, 2001, the Hon. Sohigian, Judge in this case, for the very first time disclosed that he had ownership in the defendant Merck & Co., Inc. A minute order of Jan. 18, 2001 reflected this fact. [AA p. 000370]. The Court continued a final determination as to his recusal several times. [AA p. 000371, p. 000374 and p. 000388]. On January 16, 2001, the Plaintiff tendered the KAISER defendants a Request for Dismissal of the tenth cause of action, which Request for Dismissal specifically stated that it "preserv[ed] the Plaintiff's right to appeal the prior sustaining of the demurrers to the first (1st) through ninth (9th) causes of action, inclusive." When this Request for Dismissal was tendered to the KAISER defendants, Plaintiff did not know that the Court had any stock ownership interest in any of the defendants. This dismissal was tendered to the KAISER defendants in order to expedite the appeal of the other causes of action that the Court had previously sustained demurrers to. On January 29, 2001, the KAISER defendants filed a REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL [partial] of Kaiser defendants, that had been provided to them by the Plaintiff in order to expedite the appeal of this matter. [AA p. 000372]. All parties did not consent to the Hon. Sohigian continuing as judge on this case in light of the stock ownership in one of the defendants. [AA p. 000375 and, more particularly, p. 000385]. On February 16, 2001, the Court finally disqualified/recused itself in this case. [AA p. 000392 and p. 000393]. Thereupon, the case was re-assignment to the Hon. Cesar C. Sarmiento, Judge, on March 3, 2001. [AA p. 000397]. Based thereon, i.e., based upon the disqualification, and among other reasons, the Plaintiff filed a MOTION TO AMEND COMPLIANT, TO SET ASIDE PRIOR ORDERS, OR ALTERNATIVELY ENTER JUDGMENT, which was filed Mar. 8, 2001. [AA p. 000399]. Additional documents filed by the Plaintiff in support of the motion were a Reply Brief, filed on March 26, 2001, [AA p. 000508], and a REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE TO MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT, ETC., filed Mar. 28, 2001 [AA p. 000519]. However, the Court denied the motion. [See Minute Order, AA p. 000556]. On the other hand, the Court did enter Judgment in favor of the KAISER Defendants, on May 29, 2001, the date of the hearing of the Motion to Amend. [AA p. 000556, and see Judgment at AA p. 000557]. The Notice of Appeal was filed by Plaintiff on May 7, 2001. [AA p. 000564]. STATEMENT OF APPEALABILTY On May 7, 2001, the Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from the Judgment in favor of the KAISER Defendants dated March 29, 2001. [See AA p. 000557, et seq., for Judgment and see AA p. 000564, et seq., for Notice of Appeal]. [See Code of Civil Procedure §904.1, and §904.1(a)(1), in particular]. On September 5, 2000, Plaintiff-Appellant initially challenged the demurrer rulings as to the first three causes of action for religious discrimination (cause of action no. one for religious discrimination, cause of action no. two for failure to maintain a workplace free of discrimination and cause of action no. three for retaliation) by an extraordinary writ petition, which this court summarily denied on September 13, 2000 presumably because the Plaintiff had the right to file an appeal upon a Judgment being entered at the conclusion of this case (as Plaintiff/Appellant has now done). [Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division Five, Docket No. B143989] Obviously, an order summarily denying a writ petition will not have law of the case effect, and the issue can be raised again on appeal. See Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728, 731 and Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass'n (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1064, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 84. After initially proceeding on the remaining Tenth Cause of Action as to Kaiser, the Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the remaining Tenth Cause of Action, with the express reservation that the remaining causes of action would be appealed. [AA p. 000372]. However, the dismissed cause of action was with prejudice so that that particular cause of action cannot be revived. An appeal may properly be enabled by stipulating to a dismissal of the remaining causes of action with prejudice, and allowing judgment to enter. [See Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 308-309, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 87; Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1430, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 574, 578]. Further, in multiparty actions, such as this one, a "piecemeal" Judgment that leave no issue remaining to be determined as to one or more of the parties is considered final as to those parties, and thus appealable. [Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 567-568, 139 Cal.Rptr. 97, 99 (disapproved on other grounds in Ochoa v. Super. Ct. (Santa Clara County) (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159, 171, 216 Cal.Rptr. 661, 669); Wells Fargo Bank v. California Ins. Guar. Ass'n (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 936, 941-942, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 540, fn. 5; Millscap v. Federal Express Corp. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 425, 430, 277 Cal.Rptr. 807, 810]. According to California Rules of Court, Rule 2, appeals must be filed the earlier of 1) 60 days after the mailing by the clerk of a notice of entry or file-stamped copy of a notice of entry; 2) 60 days after the service by any party of a notice of entry or file-stamped copy of the dismissal; or 3) 180 days after the date of entry. Because the Judgment was entered on March 29, 2001 [AA p. 000557], and the Notice of Appeal was filed on May 7, 2001 [AA p. 000564, et seq.], it is clear that the appeal was timely. LEGAL DISCUSSION I. "ETHICAL VEGANISM" IS THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF A RELIGION AND/OR RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDER THE CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT.
1. Religious Discrimination Prohibitions In General. Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code §12900, et seq. (hereinafter referred to as "FEHA") prohibit employment discrimination based on religion [see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Title VII); California Government Code §12940(a)-(d), (i), (j) (FEHA)]. Not only is religious discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, and the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment unlawful [42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (Title VII); Gov. Code §12940(a) (FEHA)], but there is an affirmative duty on the employer to accommodate an individual's religious beliefs or observances [42 U.S.C. §2000e(j) (Title VII); Gov. Code §12940(j) (FEHA)]. In this case, Plaintiff/Appellant has sued herein under FEHA.
2. Definition of Religion Under FEHA. "Religious creed," as it is used in the FEHA, not only includes any traditionally recognized religion, but also includes beliefs, observances, or practices that an individual sincerely holds and that occupy in his or her life a place of importance parallel to that of traditionally recognized religions. See 2 Cal. Code Reg. §7293.1, included at AA p. 000309. California Government Code §12926(o), defines the religion terms as meaning that "'Religious creed,' 'religion,' 'religious observance,' 'religious belief, and 'creed' include all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice." California Government Code §12935, regarding the "Functions, powers and duties of commission," provides that "The commission shall have the following functions, powers, and duties: (a) To adopt, promulgate, amend, and rescind suitable rules, regulations, and standards (1) to interpret, implement, and apply all provisions of this part, (2) to regulate the conduct of hearings held pursuant to Sections 12967 and 12980, and (3) to carry out all other functions and duties of the commission pursuant to this part." Under the discrimination prohibitions of FEHA, California Government Code §12940(a), (b), (d) and (c), discrimination of an employee or applicant is unlawful if committed by an employer, labor organization, employment agency or apprenticeship programs or any program leading to employment. Further, an "employer" for the purposes of the FEHA prohibitions against discrimination is defined in California Government Code §12926(d), which defines an "employer" as an individual or entity (other than a nonprofit religious association or corporation) regularly employing five or more persons or "any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly." See discussion in Bee Hive Answering Serv. (1984) No. 84-16 at 14, FEHC Precedential Decisions CEB 8 (Cal CEB 1984-1985), which held that a person acting as an agent of an employer is a person who "significantly affects access to employment." Pursuant to this authority, the Commission has defined "religious creed." 2 Cal. Code Reg. §7293.1, regarding "Establishing Religious Creed Discrimination," states, emphasis added, that "'Religious creed' includes any traditionally recognized religion as well as beliefs, observances, or practices which an individual sincerely holds and which occupy in his or her life a place of importance parallel to that of traditionally recognized religions. . . ." 2 Cal. Code Reg. §7293.3 likewise requires employers to "make reasonable accommodation to the known religious creed of an applicant or employee." A copy of this regulation is included at AA pp. 000310-000311. Even the under federal regulations, "religious practices" include moral or ethical beliefs about what is right and wrong that are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views [See 29 C.F.R. §1605.1, a copy included at AA p. 000312]. This regulation has even been used to show that even if no religious group espouses such beliefs, the belief can still be a religious belief of the employee or prospective employee, which would appear equally applicable under FEHA. Clearly, under the regulatory definition, the Plaintiff/Appellant beliefs about ethical Veganism qualify as "religious creed." The Plaintiff/Appellant has plead that he "holds these beliefs with the strength of traditional religious views. . ." [Complaint, page 2, line 24, at AA p. 000002], and that "These are sincere and meaningful beliefs which occupy a place in the Plaintiff/Appellant's life parallel to that filled by God in traditionally religious individuals adhering to the Christian, Jewish or Muslim Faiths" [Complaint, page 2, line 28, to page 3, line 2; see AA pp. 000002-000003]. This is very important, when considered in conjunction with the legal proposition that an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulation "deserves great weight." [Culligan Water Conditioning v. State Bd. Of Equalization (1976) 17 Cal.3d 86, 93]. "[T]he primary rule is to respect the subject matter expertise of the agency charged with enforcing the regulation and to defer to that agency's interpretation unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized." [Bono Enterprises, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 968, 973-974]. Therefore, the Commission's administrative regulations holding that "'Religious creed' includes any traditionally recognized religion as well as beliefs, observances, or practices which an individual sincerely holds and which occupy in his or her life a place of importance parallel to that of traditionally recognized religions. . . .," "deserves great weight," and the Plaintiff's beliefs deserve such protections under the law and under these regulations. [See 2 Cal. Code Reg. §7293.3; see also Culligan Water Conditioning v. State Bd. Of Equalization (1976) 17 Cal.3d 86, 93]. 2 Cal. Code Reg. §7293.1, continues by saying that "Religious creed discrimination may be established by showing: (a) Employment benefits have been denied, in whole or in part, because of an applicant's or employee's religious creed or lack of religious creed [or] (b) The employer or other covered entity has failed to reasonably accommodate the applicant's or employee's religious creed despite being informed by the applicant or employee or otherwise having become aware of the need for reasonable accommodation." Further, in the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC's) Determination in Anderson v. Orange County Transit Authority, Charge No. 345960598, a copy of which is included at AA pp. 000313-000314. In Anderson, the EEOC determined that Anderson, was a "strict vegetarian due to moral and ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong, and that he sincerely holds these beliefs with the strength of traditional religious views," was protected by the anti-religious discrimination statutes. Likewise, the Plaintiff/Appellant should be so protected by the anti-religious discrimination statutes here, too. Thus it is clear that the Plaintiff/Appellant's ethical Vegan beliefs are protected under the anti-discrimination statutes protecting religious beliefs and creed. Even if the Court should find that Veganism is not a religion for all that practice it, the form of Ethical Vegan beliefs and practices of the Plaintiff/Appellant do qualifies as religious beliefs and creed under FEHA. Thus it is clear that the Plaintiff's ethical Vegan beliefs are protected under the anti-discrimination statutes protecting religious beliefs and creed. Even if the Court should find that Veganism is not a religion for all that practice it, the form of ethical Vegan beliefs and practices of the Plaintiff do qualifies as religious beliefs and creed under FEHA. Furthermore, as to the retaliation cause of action, cause of action no. three, it should not matter whether Veganism is a religion or not. What matters is whether the Plaintiff reasonably believed it was a religion when he complained and protested about Kaiser not reasonably accommodating his Vegan beliefs.
II. PLAINTIFF'S TORT CLAIMS ARE NOT PREEMPTED BECAUSE THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS DOES NOT REASONABLY COME WITHIN THE "COMPENSATION BARGAIN."
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff's causes of action for battery, invasion of privacy, negligence, battery/negligence per se for failure to obtain consent to medical experimentation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress are allegedly barred under the California Workers' Compensation Act, California Labor Code §§ 3600, et seq. However, the Defendants have failed to note that workers' compensation does not preempt an employee's claim for physical or emotional injury to which workers' compensation applies if there is an express exemption, the injury is the result of conduct that does not reasonably come within the "compensation bargain," the injury is a result of conduct that "contravenes fundamental public policy," or the employee is not an employee at the time when the actionable conduct arises. Defendants state in their points and authorities that "health care providers are required by law to conduct tuberculosis testing on certain employees . . . and that Kaiser has adopted a policy requiring all employees to submit to health appraisals, including tuberculosis testing." [Demurrer memorandum of points and authorities, page 8, lines 4 to 8, inclusive, at AA p. 000039]. However, it should be noted here that neither the administrative code they cited 22 Cal. Admin. Code §70723(b), nor any other statute, code or regulation, requires that the Plaintiff a non-health care employee, who did not work in a health care facility, from being tested, nor for that matter is there any requirement in statute, code or regulation requiring Kaiser to immunize their employees. While the Defendants do not appear to be contending that workers' compensation would preempt the Plaintiff's FEHA claims, it should be noted that because statutorily prohibited discrimination is not a normal incident of employment, workers' compensation does not preempt claims brought under the FEHA. See Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 353, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292. And since Accardi held that emotional distress claims caused by the employer's discriminatory practices are not barred by workers' compensation, clearly the Plaintiff's eighth and ninth causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress, which both incorporate the prior causes of action, including the first cause of action for FEHA discrimination, the second cause of action for FEHA failure to maintain discrimination-free workplace and the third cause of action for FEHA retaliation, are not barred by workers' compensation. [See also City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, which held that FEHA claim for disability discrimination is not preempted by workers' compensation.] Likewise, the fifth cause of action for invasion of privacy, which is in part based upon the incorporation of these same FEHA allegations, should also not be preempted. Additionally, the invasion of privacy cause of action, i.e., the fifth cause of action, is based primarily upon the "Plaintiff['s] right of privacy under the United States Constitution, [and] the California Constitution, Article 1, Section 1." [See Complaint, page 15, ¶81, lines 23 and 24]. As such an invasion of the Plaintiff right of privacy would be the result of conduct that "contravenes fundamental public policy." According to Livitsanos v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 744, 754, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, injury that is the result of conduct that "contravenes fundamental public policy" is not preempted by workers' compensation. Likewise, violation of California Heath and Safety Code §§ 24170, et seq., including §24175(a), §24173, §11525 and §11530, which requires the consent of all human subjects before medical experimentation can be performed on such human subjects, would "contravene fundamental public policy," and should therefore not be preempted by workers' compensation. Further, injury that is a result of conduct that does not reasonably come within the "compensation bargain" does not preempt an employee's claims for physical or emotional injury. [See Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303].
There is no statute, code or regulation that requires Kaiser to test the Plaintiff who is not a health care employee and who does not work in a "health care facility." Further, there is no statute, code or regulation that requires Kaiser to immunize any of their employees. Therefore, Kaiser's procedures, when not involving proper informed consent, amounts to a Human Medical Experiment in violation of California Health & Safety Code §24170, et seq., as set forth in the Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action. [See Health & Safety Code §§ 24174 and 24176]. Kaiser appears to have admitted that they are attempting to use this to determine whether it is the best procedure to keep healthy its health care employees. Further, while the Plaintiff never received the vaccination, he did receive the screening test that was a part of the procedure, and hence was made a part of the medical experiment.
III. LEAVE TO AMEND WAS REQUESTED AT EVERY AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY BY THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, AND THE EXTENT THAT HIS PLEADINGS DO NOT PROPERLY SURVIVE A DEMURRER OR MOTION TO STRIKE, LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED TO THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT. Although the Plaintiff/Appellant believes that each of the two Demurrers and the Motion to Strike in issue should have been overruled and denied in their entirety, should the Plaintiff be mistaken and should the Court have properly sustained the Demurrer (or properly granted any Motion to Strike) in any respect, leave to amend should have been provided. "Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given." [Angie M. v. Sup.Ct. (Hiemstra) (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 197, 204]. In fact, it has been held to be an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. [Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349, 134 Cal.Rptr. 375, 384; Okun v. Sup.Ct. (Maple Properties) (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 460, 175 Cal.Rptr. 157, 168]. Inasmuch as the complaint at issue as to the religious discrimination in employment causes of action (causes of action one, two and three) were contained in the original Complaint when leave to amend was refused by the Court upon the Court's sustaining the original Demurrer by the Kaiser Defendants without leave, leave should have instead been granted. Likewise, as to the other causes of action which were only amended once. While the Plaintiff/Appellant believes that the manner that he plead the first, second and third causes of action in the original Complaint to be sufficient to withstand the Kaiser Defendants' demurrers, it should be noted that in the First Amended Complaint the Plaintiff/Appellant used the term "Ethical Vegan" instead of merely "Vegan" because it more accurately describes his beliefs. See the "red-lined" version of the Complaint at AA p. 000224, et seq. To the extent that "Ethical Vegan" beliefs would qualify as a religious belief, but a "Vegan" belief would not, leave should have been provided by the Court to the Plaintiff at the initial Demurrer hearing, as well as at the Motion to Amend and for other relief that was held in March 2001. Note that the trial court had barred the Plaintiff/Appellant from pleading the first, second and third causes of action of the First Amended Complaint against the Kaiser Defendants/Respondents. [See Order Sustaining Demurrers, at AA p. 000163, et seq.] At the Motion to Amend and for other relief in March 2001, the Plaintiff requested in part an order vacating disqualified Judge Sohigian's prior rulings based upon his ownership in stock of one of the defendants. While this could provide an independent basis to set aside the Judgment in this matter and remand, more importantly, it provides additional good cause for allowing leave to amend pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §473, which was requested at each Demurrer hearing as well as the formal Motion for Leave to Amend and other relief held in March 2001. Upon a showing of "good cause," the prior rulings made by a disqualified judge may be set aside by the judge who replaces the disqualified judge. Code of Civil Procedure §170.3(4). Therefore, based upon a showing of "good cause" the prior sustaining of the demurrers and motions to strike should be set aside by this Court as good cause is shown herein. Further, a Court has the inherent power to reconsider a prior order sua sponte and enter a new and different order at any time prior to entry of judgment. [Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1156-1157, 89 Cal.Rptr. 676, 682]. In fact, Code of Civil Procedure §1008 does not limit the Court's inherent power to reevaluate its interim rulings on its own motion, and to enter a new and different order any time prior to entry of judgment. [Darling, id.]. The lower Court should have done so in this case.
Furthermore, even if good cause for the setting aside of the prior sustaining of the demurrers and motions to strike was not shown, the Court still should have allow leave to amend the Complaint, as the granting of leave to amend is always within the discretion of the trial court, even up to and including during the time of a trial. [Lilley v. Key System Transit Lines (1955, 1st Dist.) 136 Cal. App. 2d 737, 189 P.2d 517 (permitting plaintiffs to amend complaint during rebuttal is not abuse of discretion where defendant shows no prejudice, does not ask for continuance, but merely objects to the motion as being "untimely.")]. In our case, leave to amend was requested at every available opportunity. Therefore, leave to amend should be granted in any event. "The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding . . . The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon such terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars . . . " [C.C.P. § 473]. It is judicial policy to resolve all disputes between the parties on their merits, and to allow amendment of the pleadings to put all such disputes at issue at the time of trial. "While a motion to permit an amendment to a pleading to be filed is one addressed to the discretion of the court . . . it is a rare case in which a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleadings so that he may properly present his case . . . If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error, but an abuse of discretion." [Calif. Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Gorgei), (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 278, 218 Cal.Rptr. 817, 819 (emphasis added).] Here, none of the proposed amendments will prejudice the defendants. "Trial courts are vested with the discretion to allow amendments to pleadings in furtherance of justice . . . That trial courts are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding, has been established policy in this state . . . resting on the fundamental policy that cases should be decided on their merits." [Hirsa v. Superior Court (Vickers), (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 173 Cal.Rptr. 418.]
Contrary to what the Defendants assert in their Oppositions, it is in fact relevant that the "Ethical Vegan" beliefs qualify for religious discrimination protections under the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). The principal purpose of vesting the Court with the discretionary power to correct "a mistake in any other respect" is to enable it to mold and direct its proceedings so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits, when it can be done without injustice to either party, whether the obstruction to such a disposition of cases be a mistake of fact or mistake as to the law, although it may be that the Court should require a stronger showing to justify relief from the effect of a mistake of law than a mistake of fact. Ward v. Clay (1890) 82 Cal. 502, 23 P. 50. Further, the original demurrer was to a Complaint that plead "Vegan beliefs" rather than "Ethical Vegan beliefs." This factual change might be significant. Ethical Veganism is a sincerely held set of moral and ethical values that rise to the level religious beliefs, and should be afforded religious protections as such. One Court held that it did not exhaust its power to grant leave to file amended pleading by denying application at trial, and it may, on motion for new trial, consider that contrary ruling would be proper. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Sunset Road Oil Co. (1917) Cal. 461, 168 P. 1037. Similarly, a Court does not exhaust its power to grant leave to file an amended Complaint by denying request in opposition to a demurrer, and it may, on a later motion, consider that a contrary ruling would be proper. Further, a Motion to Amend a Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §473, even after Judgment has been entered pursuant to the sustaining of a Demurrer, can be made under the relief provisions of this section. Risco v. Reuss (1941) 45 Cal. App. 2d 243, 113 P.2d 914. Further, it has been held that a motion for leave to amend a Complaint made within a reasonable time after the sustaining of a Demurrer without leave to amend can be properly granted. Carter v. Shinsako (1940) 42 Cal. App. 2d 9, 108 P.2d 27. While one case held in the absence of showing of excuse for delay, it is not abuse of discretion to deny motion to restore to complaint a count to which demurrer has been sustained with leave to amend, where motion was made at opening of trial more than year after demurrer was sustained, in our case the delay was reasonable. Curtis v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. (1956, 2nd Dist.) 140 Cal. App. 2d 461, 295 P2d 62. In terms of Plaintiff's reasonableness in not making this motion earlier, note that a Plaintiff may assume that further motion to amend complaint would be futile where a Judge adopted defendant's view that pleadings could not be amended to state cause of action. Carney v. Simmonds (1957) 49 Cal. 2d 84, 315 P.2d 305. One case has held that it was error for trial court after having sustained demurrer without leave to amend to deny his motion for leave to amend, denial being based on theory that court had lost jurisdiction to allow amendment by its previous order. Frantz v. Mallen (1928) 204 Cal. 159, 267 P. 314. While, denial of a motion to amend a complaint made after judgment on the pleadings was not an abuse of discretion, where the plaintiff failed to show that it could be amended to state a cause of action, in our case amendment can cure any defect, if any, and/or strengthen the Complaint from attack. Irvine v. J. F. Shea Co. (1940) 41 Cal. App. 2d 458, 107 P.2d 80. The following were the proposed changes to the religious discrimination causes of action (one, two and three), as they relate to the Kaiser defendants: - Where ever the term "Vegan" appeared in the Complaint it was replaced with "Ethical Vegan," in the First Amended Complaint. [See redlined copy of First Amended Complaint lodged/filed with the Court at the time of filing the First Amended Compliant, at AA p. 000224, et seq.]. This may be a significant change in the Complaint that the Court has never ruled upon as it applies to the KAISER defendants. While the Plaintiff believes that "Vegan" beliefs are entitled to the State's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") religious anti-discrimination, it is more so with regard to the Plaintiff's "Ethical Vegan" beliefs, which are stronger beliefs than just "Vegan" beliefs. Further, the following are the proposed additional changes to those religious discrimination causes of action (one, two and three), which are the redlined portion of the Second Amended Complaint, likewise as they relate to the Kaiser Defendants: - Insert that it is plead against the KAISER defendants as to causes of action one, two and three. [Redlined copy of Complaint attached to original Declaration in support of motion, previously filed, page 11, line 11, page 15, line 19 and page 16, line 21, see AA p. 000415, et seq.]; - Also, as to the religious discrimination retaliation cause of action (no. three), the Plaintiff wants to plead that not only did "he complain about religious discrimination," but also that he "protested about religious discrimination." [AA p. 000415, et seq., see proposed amended complaint, Page 16, line 28 to page 17, line 1]. - Further, as to the religious discrimination retaliation cause of action (no. three), the Plaintiff additionally requested to plead that "Plaintiff reasonably believed that Ethical Veganism was a religion and/or his Ethical Vegan practices constituted a religious observance and/or practice when he complained and protested about KAISER not reasonably accommodating his Ethical Vegan beliefs and/or practices, as set forth above." In this regard, both in terms of whether Ethical Veganism is the equivalent of a religion, but also whether such a belief would be reasonable, note that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has actually held and made a determination in another case that they considered it to be the equivalent of a religion. [See AA p. 000313-000314]. While the Plaintiff does not believe that any motion to strike that may have been heard to be meritorious in any respect, should the Plaintiff be mistaken, and any the motion to strike had been granted in any respect, leave to amend had been requested and should be given. It has been held that failure to allow leave to amend is an abuse of discretion. [See California Code of Civil Procedure §472a(d); Vaccara v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768-769, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 829, 833-834 (citing text)]. Further, the same liberal policy regarding amendments of pleadings on sustaining of demurrers applies here, too. Therefore, as long as any defect is correctable, an amended pleading will usually be allowed. [See Grieves v. Sup.Ct. (Fox) (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 168, 203 Cal.Rptr. 556, 561, which relied on California Code of Civil Procedure §576, which authorizes the Court to allow amendments of pleadings at any time "in the furtherance of justice."].
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, petitioner JEROLD DANIEL FRIEDMAN, also known as JERRY FRIEDMAN, respectfully requests this court to hold that "Ethical Veganism" to be a religion and/or a religious belief, or the functional equivalent of same, under California employment law with regard to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and for this reason and the other reasons set forth above, to vacate the Judgment and the sustaining of the Demurrers below, and to reverse and remand this case for further proceedings, including directions requiring the lower Court to allow leave to amend. Dated: [Date Signed] Respectfully submitted, ________________________ BY: SCOTT D. MYER, ESQ. ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL [Code Civ. Proc. § 1013a(2) ] I, SCOTT D. MYER, certify: I am, and at all times mentioned herein was, an active member of the State Bar of California and not a party to the above-entitled cause. My business address is Myer Law Firm, 11040 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 320, Los Angeles, CA 90025-7515. I served the attached APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, on [Date Sent], by depositing a copy of the document in the United States mail at City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California, in a sealed envelope, with postage fully prepaid PRIORITY MAIL, addressed to: Ms. Debbie Freedman (Attorney of record for Southern California Permanente Medical Group and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.)
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT (Court Appealed From)
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT (Court Appealed From)
who are the attorneys of record for the Defendants, the Court appealed from and the Supreme Court. At that time there was regular delivery of United States mail between the place of deposit and place of address. Dated: [Date Signed] ____________________________ SCOTT D. MYER, ESQ. FOOTNOTES: 1. Herein "Kaiser" refers to the group of Defendant/Respondents sued herein as SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, a California partnership, KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS, a California corporation, and KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC., a California corporation. 2. Herein "MacTemps" refers to the group of Defendants sued herein as MACTEMPS, an unknown business entity, AQUENT, an unknown business entity, doing business as MACTEMPS, and LASER DESIGNS, Corporation Which Will Do Business in California as MACTEMPS. MacTemps, however, was dismissed after a settlement with them, and is not a part of this appeal. See AA p. 000369. 3. A 1994 poll conducted by the Vegetarian Resource Group of 1,978 men and women reflects an estimated 500,000 Vegans in the United States. Debra Wasserman & Reed Mangels, Vegan Handbook at 229-230 (1996). Locate Books About Being Vegan           Click on the Desired Book |
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